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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model to high-
light the role of human capital accumulation of agents di¤erentiated
by skill type in the joint determination of social mobility and the
skill premium. We rst show that our model captures the empirical
co-movement of the skill premium, the relative supply of skilled to un-
skilled workers and aggregate output in the U.S. data from 1970-2000.
We next show that endogenous social mobility and human capital ac-
cumulation are key channels through which the e¤ects of capital tax
cuts and increases in public spending on both pre- and post-college
education are transmitted. In particular, social mobility creates addi-
tional incentives for the agents which enhance the benecial e¤ects of
policy reforms. Moreover, the dynamics of human capital accumula-
tion imply that, post reform, the skill premium is higher in the short-
to medium-run than in the long-run.
Keywords: social mobility, skill premium, tax and education policy
JEL Classication: E62, J31, J62
We would like to thank Richard Agènor, Stefan Bühler, Guido Cozzi, Wei Jiang,
Jochen Mankart, Kyriakos Neanidis, Tatiana Kirsanova, Ulrich Woitek and seminar par-
ticipants at the Universities of Manchester, Zürich and St. Gallen for helpful comments
and suggestions. We are also grateful for nancial support from the ESRC, Grant No.
RES-062-23-2292, but the views expressed here are entirely our own.
1
1 Introduction
There is now an extensive literature on the division of the labour force be-
tween college and high school graduates and the resulting wage premium to
skilled workers (see e.g. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Hornstein et al.
(2005) for reviews). The main drivers of the skill/wage premium are widely
accepted to be skill biased technical change (SBTC), which raises the de-
mand for skilled labour, and the relative supply of skilled versus unskilled
labour (see e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992)). Studies which attribute SBTC
to investment-specic technological progress have been shown to match the
dynamic behaviour of the skill premium in the data for the U.S. (see e.g.
Krusell et al. (2000) and He (2012)).
There is also a comprehensive literature which has examined the occupa-
tional choice of economic agents, usually focusing on the distinction between
entrepreneurs and workers, and its implications for social mobility (see e.g.
Matsuyama (2006) and the literature reviewed therein). A small strand of
this literature has studied the occupational choices of skilled and unskilled
workers, thus endogenising the relative skill supply in setups that may allow
for SBTC and the skill premium paid to college-educated workers (see e.g.
Galor and Moav (2000), Maoz and Moav (2004) and He (2012)). In this lit-
erature, an unskilled worker can choose to pay a cost when young to become
skilled, so that he/she can reap the benets of the higher (skilled) wage later
in life.
The literature has also suggested that economic policy has an impact on
the skill premium through its a¤ect on: (i) research and development and
thus SBTC (see e.g. Cozzi and Impullitti (2010)); (ii) capital accumulation
via tax reforms (see e.g. He and Liu (2008) and Angelopoulos et al. (2013a));
and (iii) labour markets via regulatory intervention (see e.g. Card and Di
Nardo (2002)). However, although education policies (see e.g. Galor and
Moav (2006) and Galor et al. (2009)) and tax policies (see e.g. Benabou
and Ok (2001) and Piketty (1995)) have been considered as important deter-
minants of social mobility, their impact on the joint determination of social
mobility and the skill premium has generally not been studied.1
This paper rst extends the literature concentrating on the endogenous
joint determination of social mobility and the skill premium by treating the
former as a dynamic process depending on the human capital accumulation
decisions of agents di¤erentiated by skill type. In particular, we develop
1An exception is the work by He and Liu (2008), who consider a representative agent
that allocates his/her time to working in the skilled and unskilled sectors, as well as to
creating the skill required for skilled employment, and examines the e¤ects of taxation
and education subsidies on the skill premium and the supply of skill.
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and incorporate a micro-founded model of work and education choices into
an innite-horizon dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model to facilitate
the study of the e¤ects of policy. This then allows us to contribute to the
policy literature through the evaluation of the dynamic e¤ects of tax reforms
and education policies on economic outcomes, with a particular emphasis on
social and wage inequality (measured by the percentage of skilled labour in
the population and the skilled premium respectively).2
To achieve our aims, we model a representative dynasty which is com-
prised of two types of members that supply either skilled or unskilled labour
services. Both types can accumulate human capital to increase their labour
productivity, as either skilled or unskilled workers, by investing part of their
time into creating new human capital (as in e.g. Lucas (1988) and Tamura
(1991)). However, the human capital accumulated by the unskilled also con-
tributes to equipping them with the knowledge to become skilled workers
and thus to improving their position on the social ladder. In particular, the
switch to the skilled type is achieved once a threshold for the level of skill is
reached. Human capital accumulation also depends on government education
spending, in addition to workerse¤orts, so that social mobility depends on
both individual choices and policy outcomes. We also allow for the possibility
that the threshold of skill required to nd employment in the skilled sector
depends on the level of human capital of skilled workers. We assume that this
is an unintentional e¤ect of the increase in human capital required in skilled
jobs and we model it as an externality that the representative household does
not internalize when making its choices.3
Following the literature, to capture SBTC, we use a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) production function which allows capital to comple-
ment skilled labour more than unskilled (see e.g. Krusell et al. (2000)). In
this framework, an increase in the e¤ective relative supply of skilled labour,
brought about by an increase in social mobility and/or an increase in the
relative human capital of skilled, will tend to decrease the skill premium.
In contrast, an increase in the physical capital stock will be skill-biased and
thus contribute to an increase in the skill premium. However, an increase in
the skill premium and, more generally, in the returns to the skilled status
2Issues relating to social mobility are generally tackled in the literature using overlap-
ping generations models. Our approach allows us to concentrate on an annual frequency
to analyse the dynamic e¤ects of policy on the transition path as well as on the long run.
3While externalities in higher education have been considered in the literature on
growth and inequality (see e.g. Penalosa and Wälde (2000) and Eicher and Penalosa
(2002)), we are not aware of studies that have examined the importance of externalities
arising from labour augmenting human capital accumulation activities of skilled labour on
the e¤ort of unskilled to become skilled.
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(dened to include access to both skilled employment and skilled education),
creates an incentive for more e¤ort to climb the social ladder. Therefore,
policies that a¤ect the skill premium will also have an indirect e¤ect on so-
cial mobility through the human capital accumulation required to become
skilled. Also, policies that a¤ect human capital and social mobility will have
an indirect e¤ect on the skill premium, via the relative skill supply channel.
The tax policy menu we consider includes levies on capital and labour in-
come. These are used to generate revenue to nance two types of government
education spending that augment human capital accumulation of unskilled
and skilled members, as well as other government spending on goods and
services. We are particularly interested in distinguishing education policies
that a¤ect the human capital accumulation of unskilled labour (typically
associated with school level and undergraduate public education spending)
from policies that a¤ect the human capital accumulation of skilled labour
(usually in the form of support of postgraduate education, further training
for professionals and other skilled workers and research grants).
We nd that the model with endogenous social mobility can capture the
empirical co-movements of the skill premium, the relative supply of skilled
to unskilled workers and aggregate output in the U.S. data from 1970-2000.
In particular, we nd that the model predictions for these empirical co-
movements are improved when we allow for positive externalities from skilled
human capital on social mobility. Our policy results rst show that endoge-
nous social mobility creates additional incentives for the agents which en-
hance the benecial e¤ects of policy on aggregate outcomes and wage equal-
ity. Second, that important dynamic e¤ects of policy on the skill premium
are captured by allowing human capital accumulation to a¤ect social mobil-
ity. In particular, post reform, the skill premium is higher in the short- to
medium-run than in the long-run. Third, that although all policy reforms
considered here lead to an increase in output and social mobility, their impli-
cations regarding the skill premium di¤er. In particular, the skill premium
increases after a capital tax cut and decreases after an increase in spending
on education for unskilled agents and in spending on education for skilled
agents.4
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the
theoretical model. Sections 3 discusses the calibration and model evaluation.
Section 4 presents the policy analysis and Section 5 concludes.
4Regarding all three results above, the e¤ects of public spending on education for skilled
agents are dependent on the externality that skilled human capital has on social mobility.
In particular, a negative externality generally reduces many of the positive e¤ects of this
policy reform.
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2 The model
In this section, we develop a model with a division of labour that allows
for endogenous labour augmenting technology through the accumulation of
human capital and social mobility in the form of an endogenous skill supply.
In particular, we use a closed-economy setup where a representative house-
hold is an innitely-lived dynasty with both skilled and unskilled members.5
These members di¤er in the type of labour services they o¤er and also in
the type of human capital they create. Following the literature, the human
capital of each type of worker can accumulate over time thanks to individual
time devoted to education and public education spending. Social mobility is
incorporated by allowing unskilled members to switch to skilled status once
their stock of human capital reaches a threshold level.
The rms use capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour to produce a
homogeneous product. Since skilled labour is more complementary to capital
than unskilled labour, capital accumulation, as well as technological devel-
opments and policies that are capital augmenting, favor the skilled wage
premium as in e.g. Krusell et al. (2000) and Hornstein et al. (2005). In
contrast, increases in the relative supply of skilled labour tend to reduce the
skill premium. Finally, the government uses capital and labour taxes to -
nance spending on two types of public education services and spending on
other goods and services.
2.1 Human capital and social mobility
The numbers of skilled and unskilled members at time t for the representative
household are denoted as N st and N
u
t respectively. Thus, the total size of the
household (population) is Nt = N st +N
u
t .
6 The respective population shares
are dened as nst = N
s
t =Nt and n
u
t = N
u
t =Nt, where Nt is assumed to grow at
an exogenous net rate,  = Nt+1
Nt
  1, to allow new unskilled members to join
the household.
Each household member, i = s; u, accumulates knowledge in the form of
5The modelling assumption that the population is made up by a representative house-
hold that is composed of members that di¤er in their labour market position is a standard
modelling device in dynamic macroeconomic models with two-state heterogeneity in the
labour market. Examples include the models incorporating search and matching labour
market frictions and unemployment (see e.g. Rogerson and Shimer (2011) and Arseneau
and Chugh (2012)). We adapt this modelling device here to capture a two-state hetero-
geneity in the labour market consisting of skilled and unskilled workers.
6The total size of the population, Nt, is assumed to be large. This allows us to approx-
imate the distribution of abilities in skill acquisition by a continuous function below.
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human capital:
hit+1 = (1  h)hit +
 
git
  
eit
1 
(1)
where 0 < h < 1 is the human capital depreciation rate; eit is time devoted
to education; git is per member public education spending; and 0 <  < 1 is
a xed productivity parameter. For skilled members, knowledge acquisition
through post-college and vocational training, job-related training seminars,
etc., is productivity enhancing. For unskilled members, in addition to its
productivity augmenting role, human capital accumulation via primary, sec-
ondary and college education also increases unskilled labours potential for
becoming skilled.
In our setup, when the e¤ective skill level of an unskilled individual, de-
ned as Sut , is higher than an exogenous level, S
, he/she becomes skilled.
We assume that Sut is the outcome of a combination of endogenous human
capital or knowledge, hut , with exogenous factors that are specic to each
individual, t. The latter captures idiosyncratic abilities, due to e.g. indi-
vidual di¤erences in aspirations, neighborhood environment, school quality,
health, etc.7
We also allow for the possibility that Sut depends on the average level of
skilled workershuman capital, h
s
t . This captures the idea that as the skilled
workers accumulate more knowledge, it may become more di¢ cult or easier,
ceteris paribus, for the unskilled to nd employment in skilled jobs. The
potentially negative e¤ect arises since, as skilled workers accumulate more
knowledge, they raise the skill threshold and make it more di¢ cult for the
unskilled to become skilled. In this case, more individual unskilled e¤ort is
required to become skilled. In contrast, increasing knowledge levels for the
skilled might create positive spillover e¤ects and increase the e¤ectiveness of
individual investment in school level and college education. Irrespective of
the direction of e¤ects on the e¤orts of the unskilled, we assume that this is
an unintentional e¤ect of the increase in human capital needed in skilled jobs
and we model it as an externality that the representative household does not
internalise when making its choices.
These relationships can be dened more formally as follows.
Denition 1. an unskilled worker becomes skilled if:
Sut  thut

h
s
t
  
> S (2)
7This idiosyncratic term generates a type of ex ante heterogeneity within the class of
unskilled labour, without which the proportion of unskilled members that become skilled
in each period would be either zero or one (see also e.g. Heckman et al. (1998) and He
(2012) for similar "idiosyncratic disutility costs").
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where t is distributed exponentially across the population and independently
in each time period, with a probability density function (pdf), f; S > 0
denotes the skill threshold; and  1 <  < 1 allows us to capture the
extent of the positive or negative externality. The pdf for  is given by:
f = e
( );  > 0 (3)
where 1= is the mean of f.
The condition dened in (2) can be rewritten as:
t>S


h
s
t
 
(hut )
 1  t (4)
which suggests that an increase in the human capital of unskilled agents
lowers the critical level of idiosyncratic abilities required for becoming skilled,
t .
8
At the beginning of each period, the unskilled agents observe their t
shock and, given (4), they know whether they can nd employment as skilled
or unskilled. If they become skilled, we assume that the newly skilled mem-
bers share the same initial conditions with existing skilled members at period
t.9 If they remain unskilled, namely if thut

h
s
t
  
 S, the household may
decide to further invest in education so as to increase the share of members
becoming skilled in the next time period.10
Equation (4) implies that the proportion of unskilled household members
who become skilled, u, is given by:
u = 1 
Z
0
fd. (5)
8Since we focus on between-group wage inequality and not on within-group labour in-
come inequality, we consider the case where all unskilled members are identical in each
time period before the realisation of the idiosyncratic ability shock is known. This re-
quires that new household members share a common value of human capital with existing
unskilled members at the period t when they join the household.
9This follows from the previous assumption on equality regarding initial conditions
within the class of unskilled, and allows us to focus on between-group, as opposed to within-
group di¤erences. See also e.g. Curdia and Woodford (2009) for similar assumptions
regarding within-group initial conditions.
10Note that there is no need for unskilled members to insure themselves from un-
favourable t shocks, as this type of insurance is provided by the household. This is
also a common assumption in two-state unemployment models with search and matching
(see e.g. Rogerson and Shimer (2011) and Arseneau and Chugh (2012)) and is discussed
in more detail in our context in the next sub-section.
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Evaluating the denite integral of (5) gives the social mobility function:
u = 1  F
h


hu; h
s
;S;  
i
(6)
where, F = 1   e( ) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of .
Note that the exponential distribution assigns a decreasing probability to
higher outcomes of . Thus, the marginal e¤ect of hu on u is positive and
increasing, reecting increasing returns to education.
Given (6), the numbers of skilled and unskilled members change over time
as follows:
N st+1 = N
s
t + 
u
t+1N
u
t (7)
and
Nut+1 = N
u
t + Nt   ut+1Nut (8)
where,
ut+1 = e

 S(hst+1)
 
(hut+1)
 1
. (9)
Equivalently, the population shares of skilled and unskilled members are
given by:11
nst+1 =
nst + 
u
t+1n
u
t
1 + 
(10)
and
nut+1 =
nut +    ut+1nut
1 + 
(11)
where nst+1 + n
u
t+1 = 1.
12
2.2 The problem of the household
In this setup, the head of the household makes all the choices on behalf of
its members, i.e. it chooses consumption and investment, and also work
and education-time, for each type of member by maximising the aggregate
welfare of all its members. Implicitly, the household provides insurance to
all its members by guaranteeing them the same level of consumption and
welfare.
11The evolution of the share of skilled (10), has, in fact, analogies with the basic employ-
ment evolution equation in search and matching models (see e.g. equation (7) in Rogerson
and Shimer (2011)). In our case, the social mobility function, ut , plays a role similar to
the job nding probability in the search literature.
12As long as 0 < u < 1, and  > 0 equation (10) implies a well dened steady-state,
where the share of skilled converges to a stationary quantity, given by ns = u= (u + ),
where 0 < ns < 1.
8
Formally, the household maximises the discounted lifetime utility of its
members: 1P
t=0
tu (ct) (12)
where ct  (cst)nst (cut )nut is a weighted average of skilled and unskilled mem-
bersconsumption; and 0 <  < 1 is the time preference rate.13 The period
utility function, u (), is increasing and strictly concave. The form we employ
for the period utility function is:
u (ct) =
c1 t
1   (13)
where  > 0 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
The households budget constraint is:
nstc
s
t + n
u
t c
u
t + it = (1   lt ) (nstwsthst lst + nutwut hut lut ) + (1   kt )rtkt (14)
where it is investment in physical capital; wst and w
u
t are the returns to skilled
labour and unskilled labour respectively; hst l
s
t and h
u
t l
u
t are the e¤ective supply
of skilled and unskilled labour; rt is the return to physical capital; and  lt
and  kt are the tax rates on labour and capital income.
The motion of physical capital is given by:
kt+1 = (1  k)kt + it (15)
where 0 < k < 1 is the physical capital depreciation rate.
Each type of worker, i = s; u, allocates one unit of his/her e¤ort time to
work and education:
lit + e
i
t = 1. (16)
Note that (1) and (16) di¤er for skilled and unskilled members, implying
that skilled and unskilled workers are distinct in the labour market and the
education sectors, consistent with the literature on social mobility.
The household, taking prices and policy as given, chooses the time paths
of cst , c
u
t , it, kt+1, l
s
t , l
u
t , e
s
t , e
u
t , h
s
t+1, h
u
t+1, and n
s
t+1 to maximize (12) and (13)
subject to constraints (1), (10), (14)  (16).
13Note that at the household level, there is no uncertainty regarding the proportion
of agents who become skilled. Also, for simplicity, there is no uncertainty regarding
the technological processes (see the discussion of the rm problem below). There is, of
course, uncertainty, for each individual within the class of unskilled workers, regarding
their progression to skilled employment. However, as discussed earlier, we assume that
the representative household provides complete income insurance to its members. In par-
ticular, the functional form that aggregates individual consumption in the utility function
implies that the household nds it optimal to equate the consumption levels for the two
types of agents. This is similar to e.g. the assumption that labour unions provide income
insurance to their members (see e.g. Pissarides (1998) and Ardagna (2007)).
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2.2.1 Trade-o¤s relating to human capital and social mobility
We now study some basic trade-o¤s in the households behavior. This will
help us to understand the quantitative results below. The Euler-equation for
skilled human capital illustrates the trade-o¤ associated with choosing hst+1:
HSt = 

BCt+1(1   lt+1)
1 + HSt+1(1  s)

where 
1  nst+1wst+1lst+1 and BCt+1 and HSt+1 are the Lagrange multipliers
attached to the budget constraint and the skilled human capital equation
respectively. The representative household equates the opportunity cost of
education-time to produce an extra unit of human capital valued in utility
terms, HSt , to the benets, given by the discounted future increase in net
labour income and human capital, valued respectively by BCt+1 and 
HS
t+1.
The choice of the quantity of unskilled human capital, hut+1, includes the
same costs and benets as above, but the benets in this case also include
the increase in the share of household members who become skilled due to a
marginal increase in hut+1:
HUt = 
 
BCt+1(1   lt+1)
2 + HUt+1(1  u)

+ SSt
 
1  nst+1

(1 + )
@ut+1
@hut+1
(17)
where 
2 
 
1  nst+1

wut+1l
u
t+1, 
HU
t is the multiplier attached to the un-
skilled human capital equation; SSt is the multiplier associated with the equa-
tion for the skilled employment share; and
@ut+1
@hut+1
 S
(hst+1)
 
e
0@ S(hst+1) 
hut+1
1A
(hut+1)
2 .
The Euler-equation for the share of skilled labour illustrates the trade-o¤
associated with choosing nst+1 :
SSt = 
BC
t+1(1  lt+1) (
3   
4)+


1 + 

SSt+1
0@1  e
 
 S(hst+2)
 
hut+2
!1A (18)
where 
3  wst+1hst+1lst+1 and 
4  wut+1hut+1lut+1. Here the costs of foregone
unskilled work-time required to increase the share of members that nd em-
ployment in skilled jobs, evaluated in utility terms via SSt , is equal to, in
equilibrium, the benets from increasing nst+1. The latter are given by the
discounted future increase in net labour income of being employed in skilled
versus unskilled jobs, valued in utility terms by BCt+1. The benets are fur-
ther augmented by the fact that a higher share of skilled increases the future
stock of skilled, and this is valued in utility terms by SSt+1.
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Note that by comparing 
3 to 
4 in the above condition for the share of
skilled labour, we can see that an increase in the skill premium will increase
the benets of employment in the skilled sector and is thus expected to
increase social mobility. Moreover, it is useful to note that the increase in
the human capital of skilled, relative to unskilled labour, also increases future
benets from employment in the skilled sector and is thus also expected to
increase social mobility.
2.3 The rm
There are N ft identical rms at each t. For simplicity, we assume N
f
t+1 =
(1 + )Nt; which implies that the number of rms equals the number of
household members. Each rm produces output, yft , using physical cap-
ital, kft , and the two distinct types of labour, unskilled, l
u;f
t , and skilled,
ls;ft , where the latter is relatively more complementary to capital than un-
skilled labour. The production function is given by a constant returns to
scale (CRS) technology assumed to take a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) specication following e.g. Krusell et al. (2000) and He (2012):
yft = A



lu;ft

+ (1  )
h


Bkft

+ (1  )

ls;ft
i 1
(19)
where A is the level of total factor productivity; B is the level of capital
productivity; ;  < 1, are the parameters determining the factor elasticities,
i.e. 1= (1  ) is the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled
labour and between skilled and unskilled labour, whereas 1=(1   ) is the
elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labour; and 0 < ;  < 1
are the factor share parameters. The above CES form allows us to capture
the capital-skill complementarity, which is considered to be one of the main
drivers of the skill premium and wage inequality (see e.g. Krusell et al. (2000)
and Hornstein et al. (2005)).
Each rm acts competitively by choosing inputs, kft , l
s;f
t and l
u;f
t , to
maximise prots:
ft  yft   rtkft   wst ls;ft   wut lu;ft (20)
subject to the technology constraint, (19) : In equilibrium, prots, ft , are
zero.
Notice that the di¤erent roles played by skilled and unskilled labour in the
production function imply that there will be a skill premium for the former,
in the sense that the ratio of wst to w
u
t will be larger than unity.
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2.4 Government budget constraint
The government taxes capital and labour income to nance the two types
of public education spending and general-purpose public consumption. Note
that the latter is used for calibration purposes only. Thus, the within period
budget constraint of the government is simply:
gut + g
s
t + g
c
t = 
k
t rtkt + 
l
t (n
s
tw
s
th
s
t l
s
t + n
u
tw
u
t h
u
t l
u
t ) (21)
where gct denotes public consumption.
2.5 Market-clearing conditions
The market-clearing conditions for capital, skilled labour, unskilled labour
and goods are respectively:
kft = kt (22)
ls;ft = n
s
t l
s
th
s
t (23)
lu;ft = n
u
t l
u
t h
u
t (24)
yft = ct + kt+1   (1  ) kt + gut + gst + gct (25)
where (25) also gives the resource constraint of the economy.
2.6 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
The dynamics of the economy are characterized by the rst-order conditions
of the representative household and rms, the government budget constraint,
the aggregate resource constraint and government policies.14 A symmetric
decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) can be dened as follows.
Denition 2. A symmetric DCE is an allocation sequence fcst ; cut ; it; kt+1; lst ;
lut ; e
s
t ; e
u
t ; h
s
t+1; h
u
t+1; n
s
tg1t=0, a price sequence fwst ; wut ; rtg1t=0, a sequence of pol-
icy instruments

 kt ; 
l
t ; g
u
t ;g
s
t ; g
c
t
	1
t=0
and initial conditions for k0, hs0, h
u
0 , and
ns0 such that:
1. the representative household and rms undertake their respective op-
timization problems;
2. all budget constraints are satised; and
3. all markets clear.
14To preserve space all these conditions are not reported here but are available on
request.
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We discuss below the computational methods implemented to solve for
the dynamic equilibrium paths. The stability properties of the equilibrium
are discussed in Appendix A.
2.7 The skill premium
We can now examine the factors that drive the skill premium in our setup.
The competitive equilibrium above implies that the skill premium is given
by:
wst
wut
=
(1  )

(1  ) (
5) 1 (
6)1  [ (Bkt) + (1  ) (
5) ]


 1 (26)
where 
5  nsthst lst and 
6  (1  nst)hut lut . Consistent with the literature
(see e.g. Krusell et al. (2000) and He and Liu (2008)), the skill premium
is, ceteris paribus, increasing in the capital stock, as long as  >  and
0 < ,, < 1. To see this, note that:
@

wst
wut

@kt
=
(1  )

(1  ) (
5) 1 (
6)1  (27)
 [ (Bkt) + (1  ) (
5) ]


 2
(  ) B (Bkt) 1 :
Moreover, note that the e¤ective relative skill supply in this model is given
by n
s
th
s
t l
s
t
(1 nst )hut lut . In models that exclude human capital and social mobility the
relative skill supply is dened as l
s
t
lut
. Hence, in our model, human capital
of each type of agent augments their e¤ective labour supply and thus tends,
ceteris paribus, to increase the skill premium, for the case of unskilled human
capital, and decrease it, for the case of skilled human capital. To see this,
note that:
@

wst
wut

@ ((1  nst)hut lut )
=
(1  )

(1  ) (1  ) (
5) 1 (
6)  (28)
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5) ]


 1
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
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5) 2 (
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 1
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(1  )

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5) 1
 (
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
 2
(  ) (1  )  (
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The above expressions can be signed as positive and negative respectively
since all quantities are positive and  < 0 and 0 < ,, < 1.
Regarding the e¤ect of social mobility, it can be shown that in our model,
the skill premium is, ceteris paribus, decreasing in the share of skilled labour,
for values of  < 0 and 0 < ,, < 1. To see this, note that:
@

wst
wut

@nst
=
(1  ) (1  )hut lut (
5) ((1  ) (
5) +  (Bkt))


 2

7
 (nst)
2 hst l
s
t (
6)
 (30)
where 
7  [(  1) (1  )] (
5) + [ (1  nst) + nst   1]  (Bkt) . The
derivative is negative if 
7 < 0. This follows since  < 0) [ (1  nst)+nst
 1] < 0) 
7 < 0.
To summarise, as in the literature, the skill premium increases when
the capital stock increases and when the relative e¤ective labour supply of
skilled decreases. In our model, given that e¤ective labour supply is driven
by social mobility and the two types of human capital, the above analysis
implies that, all else constant, increases in social mobility and skilled human
capital work to lower the skill premium. In contrast, controlling for social
mobility, increases in the human capital of the unskilled tends to increase
the skill premium.
3 Quantitative analysis
In this section we calibrate the model and solve for the steady-state. We
examine four versions of the model, three with social mobility (i.e. with no
externalities and with both negative and positive externalities in the social
mobility function) and one without social mobility. In the latter case, the
shares of skilled and unskilled members in the total population remain xed
as is typically assumed in the skill premium literature.
3.1 Calibration and long-run solution
The calibrated parameters for the model presented in Section 2 are shown
in Table 1. We use values that are common in the literature and choose the
remaining parameters so that the models steady-state is consistent with the
relevant data averages for the U.S. economy over the period 1970-2000.15 The
relative skill supply and skill premium data are from Acemoglu and Autor
(2011). These have been extensively analysed in e.g. Autor et al. (2008)
15Note that this is the time period used in most econometric and empirical studies on
the skill premium that we use to parameterise the elasticities in the production function.
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and Acemoglu and Autor (2011).16 We also use the ECFIN e¤ective capital
and labour tax rates from Martinez-Mongay (2000).17 The remaining data
relating to GDP and its components are from the U.S. NIPA accounts.
Table 1: Parameter values
parameter value denition
0 < 1
1 < 1 1.669 capital to unskilled labour elasticity
0 <  < 1 0.980 rate of time preference
0    1 0.080 depreciation rate on physical capital
0  h 1 0.100 depreciation rate on human capital
0    1 0.100 education spending productivity parameter
1
1 > 0 0.669 capital to skilled labour elasticity
0 <  < 1 0.595 capital weight in composite input share
 > 1 2.000 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
 > 0 0.010 net population growth rate
0 < gu=y < 1 0.099 gu spending share in output
0 < gs=y < 1 0.010 gs spending share in output
0 < gc=y < 1 0.131 gc spending share in output
0 <  k< 1 0.309 capital tax rate
0 <  l< 1 0.211 labour tax rate
Parameters for externalities
 = 0
1= > 0 0.048 mean of the idiosyncratic abilities distribution
0 <  < 1 0.355 labour weight in composite input share
 = 1
1= > 0 0.146 mean of the idiosyncratic abilities distribution
0 <  < 1 0.355 labour weight in composite input share
 =  1
1= > 0 0.016 mean of the idiosyncratic abilities distribution
0 <  < 1 0.355 labour weight in composite input share
We use commonly employed values for the rate of time preference, , the
depreciation rate on physical capital, , the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
, and the population growth rate, . We follow Perli and Sakellaris (1998)
and calibrate the depreciation rate on human capital, h, to be 10%. The
16Following Autor et al. (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011), the relative skill supply
is calculated as the ratio of college equivalent to non-college equivalent labour supply in
e¢ ciency units. The skill premium is dened as the ratio of college to high school wages.
17In particular, we use the LITR and KITN rates for e¤ective average labour and capital
taxes respectively, as they treat self-employed income as capital income in the calculations.
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tax rates are set to their data averages. Finally, we normalise the exogenous
productivity parameters, i.e. A, B, and S, to unity.
Two key steady-state variables we concentrate on matching to the data
averages include the skill premium (i.e. 1:648) and the relative skill supply
(i.e. 0:876). The elasticities in the production function are parameterised
using the estimates in Krusell et al. (2000), i.e.  =  0:495 and  = 0:401,
implying elasticities of substitution between capital and skilled labour and
between capital (or skilled labour) and unskilled labour of about 0:67 and
1:67 respectively.18 We then calibrate  so that our solution implies that in
the steady-state the capital share in income is about a third. The production
function parameter  is set so that the model predicts a steady-state skill
premium that is equal to the average of the 1970-2000 period of 1:648.19 The
key parameter that a¤ects the share of skilled labour in the labour force is ,
which determines the mean in the distribution of the idiosyncratic abilities,
t, in the social mobility function. This is calibrated so that the models
prediction of the share of skilled labour is equal to the data average of the
share of skilled workers in the total labour force of about 0:467 which implies
a relative skill supply of 0:876.
We also target average public spending shares of output in the data (see
Table 1). Government education spending, gu, gs, and the education spend-
ing productivity parameter, , are calibrated so that the public education
share in GDP and the total government spending in GDP are consistent with
the data. In particular, government spending on education for unskilled is
calibrated to be ten times higher than that on skilled, reecting the fact
that post-college education spending and spending on activities that may
increase the productivity of skilled labour is only a small fraction of govern-
ment spending on education. Given that government spending on education
is about 7% of GDP in national accounts (see the Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis), we calibrate the government spending on labour augmenting technology
for both skilled and unskilled to be about 10% of output, to capture the
potential e¤ects of government spending on human capital outside of formal
education (e.g. in the form of training for skilled and unskilled workers in
administration, health, defense, government support of R&D, etc.).
We also examine the importance of externalities in the social mobility
function by considering three special cases for  : (i) the benchmark case
without externalities, obtained by setting  = 0; (ii) negative externalities
where  = 1; and (iii) positive externalities where  =  1. The remaining
18As discussed in Krusell et al. (2000) and Hornstein et al. (2005), these estimates
cohere well with the microeconometric evidence reported in the literature.
19See also e.g. He and Liu (2008) for a similar approach.
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model parameters are common across these three cases, except for  and 
which are calibrated in each case to obtain the relative skill supply and skill
premium in the data.20 Note that the steady-state solution for the model is
the same for all three calibrations of  , given the re-calibration of  and .
Finally, note that the models steady-state predictions for consumption and
investment as a share of output of approximately 0:6 and 0:16 respectively,
as well as the capital to output ratio of about 2, are broadly in line with the
stylised facts for the U.S. economy.
3.2 Dynamic solution for 1970-2000
Given the focus of our analysis, we next evaluate the ability of the model to
capture the co-movement of the skill premium, the relative supply of skilled
to unskilled workers and output. To achieve this, we solve and simulate the
model using actual data for capital augmenting technology21 and the policy
instruments for the period 1970-2000 and compare the model predictions to
those in the actual data.22 Our simulations therefore include the main ex-
ogenous drivers of the skill premium considered in the literature, i.e. capital
augmenting technology and policy. We solve all versions of our model, i.e.
( = 0; 1; 1) as well as the case without social mobility.
To solve and simulate the model, we work as follows (see e.g. Conesa et
al. (2007) and He (2012) for a similar approach). First, we solve the steady-
state of the model for the tax and spending data in 1970, which implies that
 and  are calibrated in each case to obtain the relative skill supply and
skill premium for 1970. The remaining parameters are as in Table 1. We
then solve the dynamic DCE system for T periods, providing this system the
time series for Bt,  kt , 
l
t , g
u
t , g
s
t for the rst 31 years and assuming that these
exogenous variables remain at at their 2000 value thereafter. Finally, we
let gct be residually determined so that the government budget constraint is
satised.
The initial conditions for the models state variables are given by the 1970
solution. For the terminal values of the forward looking variables, we assume
20Note that this results in no di¤erences in  to three decimal places.
21To construct this measure, we follow He (2012) and use the quality-adjusted price
index of total investment (in equipment and structures) and the o¢ cial NIPA price index of
consumption (nondurable and services) from Cummins and Violante (2002). The resulting
capital augmenting technology index is then re-intialised to unity in 1970.
22Note that since we cannot disaggregate education spending data to pre-postgraduate
and postgraduate education, we assume that government spending on skilled human capi-
tal moves proportionately to total government education spending. The degree of propor-
tionality is, as discussed previously, equal to 0.1.
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that after T years the dynamic system has converged to its new steady-
state. This implies that the appropriate terminal conditions are obtained by
setting the values for these variables equal to those of the preceding period.
After appropriate substitutions at the level of the DCE, the nal system
is given by (8 T ) equations, which is solved non-linearly using standard
numeric methods (see, e.g. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) and Angelopoulos et al.
(2013b)). This gives the dynamic transition to the new steady-state for the
models endogenous variables. We set T = 400 to ensure that convergence
is achieved. Our results show that this occurs for all endogenous variables
within 150 years.
Table 2: Model(s) vs data correlations

 
ws
wu
; y

( n
s
nu
; y) (w
s
wu
; n
s
nu
)
Data (1970-2000) 0.928 0.970 0.849
Model 1:  = 0 0.965 0.972 0.921
Model 2:  = 1 0.980 0.978 0.982
Model 3:  =  1 0.940 0.964 0.857
Model 4: no soc. mob. 0.981 0.000 0.000
With the exception of the model without social mobility (i.e. Model 4),
Table 2 suggests that Models 1-3 match the data correlations reasonably
well. On balance, the model with positive externalities ( =  1), appears
to match the data correlations better than Models 1-2. All models slightly
over-predict 
 
ws
wu
; y

with Model 3 showing a correlation which is closest
to that in the data. While there is not much di¤erence across models for
( n
s
nu
; y) (except for Model 4), the correlation for Model 1 is the closest to
the data correlation followed by Models 3 and 2 respectively. Finally Model
3 clearly outperforms all other models with respect to (w
s
wu
; n
s
nu
).
4 Policy reforms
In what follows, we rst outline how we implement permanent policy reforms.
We then turn to the analysis of the transition dynamics and long-run impli-
cations of the reforms. We focus on policies targeted at increasing physical
capital via a capital tax cut and at encouraging skilled and unskilled human
capital accumulation via increases in government spending of each education
type. Policy reforms are nanced by changes in the labor tax rate.
18
4.1 Implementation of reforms
First, we solve for the pre-reform steady-state and assume that the econ-
omy has been in this equilibrium until period zero. Then, we impose the
policy reform on the pre-reform equilibrium in period zero and obtain the
dynamic solution of the non-linear system as discussed above. In particular,
we impose the reform in period-0 and solve the dynamic DCE system for T
periods. We implement this by changing one policy instrument at a time and
keeping it at at its new post-reform value, while letting  lt be residually de-
termined to satisfy the government budget constraint. The remaining policy
instruments are held xed at their pre-reform values. The initial conditions
for the models state variables are given by the steady-state solution of the
pre-reform economy. Terminal values of the forward looking variables and
convergence are determined using the same procedure as described above.
Our results again show that convergence occurs for all endogenous variables
within 150 years.
In Figures 1-3, we plot the transition paths of the key endogenous vari-
ables of the system fct; yt; kt+1; lst ; lut ; hst+1; hut+1; nst+1; w
s
wu
;  ltgT t=0, T  = 150 for
each reform considered. In each Figure, we plot the paths for all versions of
our model, i.e. ( = 0; 1; 1) as well as the case without social mobility.
4.2 Tax reform: a capital tax cut
We rst examine the case of a revenue neutral, elimination of the capital tax
in Figure 1. Consistent with the literature (see e.g. Mankiw et al. (2009),
Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) and Ljungvist and Sargent (2012) for reviews), a
capital tax cut is expected to improve aggregate outcomes in representative
agent models, especially over longer time horizons. Figure 1 shows that
output increases post-reform, while consumption increases after the initial 10-
20 years, since in the initial post-reform years the household nds it optimal
to increase investment and reduce consumption, in response to the higher
returns to physical capital.
[Figure 1 here]
As the plot for the skill premium suggests, this improvement in aggre-
gate outcomes also implies increased wage inequality. The reason is that
the policy-induced increase in the capital stock is skill-biased because capital
complements skilled labour more than unskilled. Hence, as discussed in sub-
section 2.7, the skill premium increases with the capital stock post-reform.
These e¤ects are qualitatively similar across the four versions of the model.
However, the models that allow for endogenous accumulation of skill, also
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predict that social mobility will increase post-reform, as can be seen in the
plot for the skilled share in the population. As pointed out in sub-section
2.7, an increase in the skill premium works to encourage the accumulation
of unskilled human capital, as a means to increase social mobility to capture
the higher returns associated with skilled employment.23 In turn, this has
important quantitative e¤ects on the skill premium, as the resulting increase
in the relative skill supply acts to lower the skill premium.24 In fact, the
reduction in the skill premium starts taking e¤ect 20-30 years after the re-
form, when the increase in the share of skilled labour is su¢ ciently strong to
counterbalance the increase in the capital stock. As a result, the dynamic re-
sponse of the skill premium is hump-shaped and suggests that it over-shoots
in the short- to medium-run compared with its long-run value. Nevertheless,
the relative supply e¤ects are not strong enough to dominate the skill-biased
increase in the capital stock in the long-run, so that the skill premium is
higher post-reform.
Our analysis suggests that there are important quantitative di¤erences
between models that allow for social mobility, regarding their predictions for
the e¤ects of a capital tax cut. In particular, the wage inequality e¤ects are
dampened. At the same time, the aggregate output and consumption e¤ects
are higher, since the economy benets from the increase in the share of skilled
workers whose productivity is higher. We conclude, therefore, that exclud-
ing social mobility from models with capital-skill complementarity leads to
under-predicting the positive e¤ects of capital tax cuts, by under- and over-
estimating, respectively, the aggregate e¢ ciency and wage inequality e¤ects.
We also see in Figure 1 that the existence of either positive or negative ex-
ternalities from skilled human capital in the social mobility function is not
important for this result, since the model predictions are similar quantita-
tively for both versions of the model, especially in the medium- to long-run.
This is due to the fact that skilled human capital, while changing in the
short-run, reverts to its pre-reform steady-state by the medium-run.
23Recall that an increased quantity of human capital for the unskilled workers, has two
e¤ects on the relative skill supply. On one hand, it increases the e¤ective labour supply
of unskilled labour, and thus tends, ceteris paribus, to decrease the e¤ective relative skill
supply. However, at the same time, by increasing the proportion of skilled members,
through the social mobility function, it tends to increase the e¤ective relative supply of
skilled labour. The second e¤ect dominates here given the large increase in social mobility.
24Our results are generally consistent with He and Liu (2008), who also nd that in a
calibrated model with endogenous skill accumulation, capital tax cuts will increase the
skill premium, while, at the same time, increasing the relative skill supply.
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4.3 Increases in gu
We next examine the e¤ects of a 50% increase in government spending on
education that aims to encourage the accumulation of human capital for
unskilled workers. The post-reform dynamic paths are plotted in Figure 2.
As expected, the stock of human capital for unskilled labour increases and
this raises output in all models and social mobility in the models that allow for
endogenous skill accumulation. In turn, as discussed in sub-section 2.7, this
increase in the relative supply of skill leads to a decline in the skill premium
in the medium- to long-run. However, initially, the skill premium increases.
This is because the labour productivity gains, brought about by the increase
in human capital, also increase the return to physical capital and thus lead
to increased capital stock, which tends to increase the skill premium. When
the relative skill supply has increased su¢ ciently, the skill premium starts
to decline. In this case, in fact, the increase in the share of skilled in the
population is su¢ ciently strong to decrease the skill premium in the long-
run. Therefore, the dynamic processes of human capital accumulation and
social mobility have non-trivial implications on the joint determination of
the paths for skill premium-social mobility. In particular, although wage
inequality is reduced in the long-run, along with increased social mobility,
this implies increased wage inequality in the short- to medium-run (about 10
years post-reform), as can be seen by the hump-shaped reaction of the skill
premium.
[Figure 2 here]
In the long-run, government spending on unskilled education, by increas-
ing the labour productivity of unskilled labour and increasing their skill ac-
cumulation, raises output, reduces wage inequality and improves social mo-
bility. Note, however, that consumption is reduced, due to the increase in the
distortionary labour tax required to nance the higher education spending,
which implies that the output gains are not big enough to accommodate the
increase in investment in physical capital and government education spending
as well. As a result, the increase in government education spending crowds
out private consumption.
The e¤ects of the increase in gu are e¤ectively identical for all versions
of the model that assume  = 0; 1; 1 for the same reasons as explained
above. However, the plots in Figure 2 again suggest that there are important
di¤erences between these three versions of the model and the model without
social mobility. The absence of the latter implies that the skill premium
post-reform will increase, as the rise in the human capital of the unskilled
increases the relative supply of skilled in labour e¢ ciency units, while the
increase in the capital stock also favours skilled labour. Thus, both factors
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tend to increase wage inequality. Moreover, the e¤ects of the policy reform
on aggregate output and consumption are worse in this model. Therefore, as
in the previous case, ignoring social mobility results in underestimating the
e¤ects of government education spending on output and consumption and in
overestimating the e¤ects on wage inequality.
4.4 Increases in gs
We next examine the e¤ects of a 50% increase in government spending on
education that aims to encourage the accumulation of human capital for
skilled workers. The post-reform dynamic paths are plotted in Figure 3.
In principle, this should not be expected to directly a¤ect social mobility,
at least when  = 0, so we start our analysis from this case. An increase
in public funding for skilled human capital increases the quantity of skilled
human capital and thus the e¤ective supply of skilled labour. This in turn
acts to lower the skill premium (see the discussion in sub-section 2.7), despite
the increase in physical capital. These movements are conrmed in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 here]
The fall in the skill premium tends, other things equal, to decrease the
incentives to become skilled for the reasons outlined in sub-section 2.7. How-
ever, the increase in the relative quantity of skilled human capital, increases
future productivity di¤erentials, as captured by the di¤erence between skilled
and unskilled human capital, and thus acts to support the desire for employ-
ment in the skilled sector (see equation (18)). As a result, social mobility
increases. Moreover, the increased productivity in the economy increases
output and consumption. Therefore, compared with public spending on the
education of the unskilled and capital-tax induced physical capital support-
ing policies, increases in public spending on the productivity of skilled labour
appear to be able to increase aggregate output and consumption while de-
creasing social and wage inequality as well.
However, in contrast to our nding thus far, these results are sensitive to
the assumption of the externalities that skilled human capital may have on
social mobility. When these externalities are negative (i.e. when  = 1), the
e¤ects of social mobility and wage inequality are reversed, while the positive
aggregate e¤ects on output and consumption are reduced. The reason is that
the increase in the human capital of the skilled members now makes it more
di¢ cult for unskilled members to become skilled, thus reducing social mo-
bility. In turn, this decreases the relative supply of skilled labour, such that
the skill premium increases. In contrast when externalities are positive (i.e.
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when  =  1), the benecial e¤ects on social mobility, wage inequality, and
welfare are enhanced relative to the  = 0 case. This is because higher levels
of skilled human capital increase the productivity of individual investment
in school level and college education.
Finally, the model with a xed share of skilled workers in the labour force
underestimates the positive aggregate e¤ects on output and consumption and
the decline in the skill premium, compared with the  = 0; 1   1 models,
since it misses the positive e¤ects of the reform on social mobility.25
5 Conclusions
This paper examined the role of human capital and economic policy in the
joint determination of the skill premium and the transition from unskilled
to skilled employment. To achieve this, we developed a DGE model with
human capital incorporating capital-skill complementarity and endogenous
social mobility. We found that incorporating endogenous versus xed so-
cial mobility allowed us to capture the empirical co-movement of the skill
premium, the relative supply of skilled to unskilled workers and aggregate
output in the U.S. data from 1970-2000. The model predictions are closer
to the empirical co-movements when we allow for positive externalities from
skilled human capital on social mobility.
Our setup rst implied that the wage inequality e¤ects of capital tax
cuts are signicantly dampened by the increase in the relative skill sup-
ply, which follows the increased returns to upward social mobility, while,
at the same time, the aggregate e¢ ciency e¤ects of the capital tax cut be-
come stronger. Thus, excluding endogenous social mobility from models with
capital-skill complementarity underestimates the benecial e¤ects of capital
tax cuts by under-predicting the positive output and consumption e¤ects and
over-predicting the negative wage inequality e¤ects.
Second, we found that the qualitative e¤ects of public spending educa-
tion policies on the skill premium change with endogenous social mobility.
In particular, it is only when we account for social mobility that an increase
in education spending for the unskilled lowers the skill premium, while si-
multaneously increasing the relative skill supply. Thus, as with capital tax
cuts, ignoring social mobility results in an under- and over-estimation, respec-
tively, of the aggregate e¢ ciency and wage inequality e¤ects of government
education spending for unskilled labour.
25Note that e¤ects of public education spending discussed in the last two sub-sections
are qualitatively robust to changes in the education productivity parameter, , consistent
with our base calibration.
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Third, our analysis suggested that, in the absence of externalities, in-
creases in government spending on the education of the skilled agents has
positive e¤ects on output and consumption, as well as encouraging social
mobility, despite the reduction in the skill premium. This occurs because, by
supporting the productivity of the skilled, the government indirectly increases
the potential future benets of the unskilled, if they succeed in climbing the
social ladder. These positive outcomes are again under-estimated when the
e¤ects of this type of policy on social mobility are ignored. However, these
results are sensitive to whether externalities of skilled human capital on so-
cial mobility are positive or negative. The former enhance the positive e¤ects
on social mobility, wage inequality, and welfare, whereas the latter reverse
them for social mobility and wage inequality and lower them for welfare.
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6 Appendix: Uniqueness of solution
6.1 Analytic results
A unique equilibrium requires that the primitive functions describing prefer-
ences and technology, as well as the constraints, are at least quasi-concave.
With the exception of the constraint referring to the share of skilled mem-
bers, it is well known that the remaining functions in our model satisfy this
condition. To check the skilled share dened on the positive quadrant R2+ as:
nst+1 =
nst + e
 
 S(hst+1)
 
hut+1
!
(1  nst)
1 + 
(31)
we next sign the leading principle minors of the Hessian matrix, D2f(x), of
(31), where D is the matrix derivative operator and x =
 
nst
hut+1

. The principle
minors, given by:
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4 < 0, (33)
imply that the matrix D2f(x) is indenite. Thus, (31) is neither concave nor
convex on R2+.
6.2 Simulation results
Since we cannot analytically establish uniqueness, we numerically check for
potential multiple equilibria by solving the nonlinear dynamic system of
27
(8 T ) for T = 400 over a range of initial values for the models state-
variables including kt, hst , h
u
t , and n
s
t . Conditional on the calibration dis-
cussed in Table 1, we construct this range such that initial values for each
state-variable is up to 65% above and below their respective steady-state
value.
In all cases, we nd that dynamic transition paths for all endogenous
variables revert to their unique steady-state equilibrium values. This nding
also applies if we change the initial values of all the state-variables simulta-
neously by the same percentages. If we move beyond 65% change in initial
values, we nd that the model no longer solves which is not surprising given
that changes of such magnitude are no longer consistent with the calibration.
Thus, we conclude that the equilibrium is uniquely dened for very large
deviations of the economys state variables from the steady-state. Moreover,
by linearising around the unique steady-state and using standard eigenvalue
tests, we also nd that the equilibrium is locally stable.
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Figure 1: fall in k to 0
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Figure 2: rise in gu by 50%
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